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We identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which a coarse data set can
be coarsely rationalized by a linear order (or weak order). The conditions are easy to
check, and efficient algorithms are provided. We apply our theory to investigate the
observable restrictions of several economic models including (1) rational choice with
imperfect observation; (2) multiple preferences; (3) monotone multiple preferences; and
(4) minimax regret.
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1 Introduction
Pioneered by Samuelson (1938), revealed preference is one of the most influential ideas in
economics and has been applied to a number of areas of economics, including consumer theory
(Afriat (1967)), general equilibrium theory (Brown and Matzkin (1996)), and industrial
organization (Carvajal et al. (2013)), among many others.
In a typical revealed preference exercise, it is assumed that there is an observer who
records the choice behavior of the decision maker (DM). Alternative x is revealed to be
preferred to alternative y if and only if x is chosen when y is also available. Thus, the
standard revealed preference argument hinges on an implicit assumption that the observer
could perfectly observe the DM’s choice in different feasible sets.
Suppose that the observer does not have perfect observation of the DM’s choice. Rather,
she has only coarse observations of the form (A,B), where A is a feasible set from which
the DM needs to make a choice, and B is a nonempty subset of A. The interpretation of
(A,B) is that the observer knows that, when facing feasible set A, the DM chooses some
alternative in B, but she does not know the DM’s exact choice. Suppose that the observer has
multiple coarse observations O = {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1, termed a coarse data set, we are interesting in
testing whether the observed choice behavior of the DM is consistent with the rational choice
model where the DM has a strict preference  over alternatives and chooses the -maximal
alternative for all feasible sets from which the DM needs to make a choice. A coarse data set
O = {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 is said to be coarsely rationalizable by a strict preference if there exists a
strict preference  over alternatives such that the maximal element in Ai according to  lies
in Bi. Consider the following example.
Example 1 (A coarse data set that is not coarsely rationalizable by a strict preference).
Consider a coarse data set O consisting of the following n (n ≥ 5) observations:
1. A1 = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, B1 = {x1, x2};
2. A2 = {x2, x3, x4, x5}, B2 = {x2, x3};
. . . ;
n. An = {xn, x1, x2, x3}, B4 = {xn, x1}.
We claim that O is not coarsely rationalizable by a strict preference. Indeed, suppose
that there exists a strict preference  that coarsely rationalizes O. Each observation i reveals
that there exists some alternative x in Bi such that x ∗ y for all y ∈ Ai \ {x}. That is,
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1. (1a) x1 ∗ x2, x1 ∗ x3, x1 ∗ x4, or (1b) x2 ∗ x1, x2 ∗ x3, x2 ∗ x4;
2. (2a) x2 ∗ x3, x2 ∗ x4, x2 ∗ x5, or (2b) x3 ∗ x2, x3 ∗ x4, x3 ∗ x5;
. . . ;
n. (na) xn ∗ x1, xn ∗ x2, xn ∗ x3, or (nb) x1 ∗ xn, x1 ∗ x2, x1 ∗ x3.
One way to proceed is to consider all possible combinations. For example, suppose that
(1a), (2a), . . ., and (na) hold simultaneously. Since (1a) requires that x1 ∗ x2, (2a) requires
that x2 ∗ x3, . . ., and (na) requires that xn ∗ x1, we have a contradiction. By going through
all combinations and deriving a contradiction for each case, one can conclude that O is not
coarsely rationalizable by a strict preference. Having said that, proceeding in this way runs
into computational issues as the number of observations increases.
In this paper, we provide a systematic analysis of the revealed preference theory under
coarse information. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which a coarse data
set can be coarsely rationalized by a linear order (or weak order). For sake of clarity, we start
by discussing the coarse rationalizability of a data set by a linear order. A coarse data set
O = {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 is said to be coarsely rationalizable by a linear order if there exists a linear
order P over alternatives such that the maximal element in Ai according to P lies in Bi.We
identify a necessary and sufficient condition, termed Coarse SARP, for coarse rationalizability
by a linear order. Coarse SARP requires that
Coarse SARP. For any ∅ 6= O′ ⊂ O, ∪(Ai,Bi)∈O′ Ai \ ∪(Ai,Bi)∈O′ (Ai \Bi) 6= ∅.
That Coarse SARP is a necessary condition for coarse rationalizability by a linear order
should come as no surprise. Suppose that a data set is coarsely rationalizable by a linear
order. Consider any nonempty subcollection ∅ 6= O′ ⊂ O. Since for any (Ai, Bi) ∈ O′ the
maximal element in Ai is not contained in Ai \Bi, the maximal element in ∪(Ai,Bi)∈O′ Ai is
not contained in ∪(Ai,Bi)∈O′ (Ai \Bi). We show that Coarse SARP is also sufficient for coarse
rationalizability by a linear order.
Notably, it is easy to check whether the Coarse SARP condition holds. In the standard
revealed preference exercise, the usual treatment is to derive preference relations between
alternatives from each observation, and then check for acyclicity. Rather than deriving
preference relations between alternatives from each observation, our approach offers for a
more convenient way of testing the data set by working with sets of observations and sets
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of alternatives. We provide an efficient algorithm that drastically decreases the difficulty
of checking whether the a coarse data set is coarsely rationalizable by a linear order. For
an arbitrary coarse data set O with m alternatives and n data points, the number of steps
required in the algorithm is at most min{m,n}.
Our theory can be readily applied to test the observable restrictions of the rational
choice model with imperfect observation. We note that there are several instances in which
the imperfect observation of the DM’s choice arises naturally. This occurs in situations where
the observer sees an agent committing to choosing from some subset of a feasible set, without
observing her ultimate choice. For example, consider a two-stage choice of the DM. The DM
is assumed to know all restaurants/ menus that he might select. The DM chooses a meal
eventually, but his initial choice is of a restaurant/ menu from which he will later chooses
his meal. If the observer only has knowledge of the restaurant/ menu that the DM chooses,
but not the DM’s ultimate choice, this could be modeled as rational choice under imperfect
observation. For another example, consider X = X1 ×X2, where X1 is the set of alternatives
available at date 1, and X2 is the set of available alternatives at date 2. The agent chooses
(x1, x2) from a nonempty feasible set A ⊆ X. If the observer only has knowledge that the
choice of the DM at date 1, but not the choice at date 2, this again could be modeled as
rational choice under imperfect observation. Such a framework would be suitable in a variety
of contexts, such as intertemporal choice problems, where information about the choice(s) of
the agent is revealed in stages.1
We hasten to emphasize that our framework works beyond the rational choice model
with imperfect observation. We also motivate our theory from a theoretical perspective.
We show that our theory can also be applied to investigate the observable restrictions of a
number of behavioral models including the multiple preferences model, the monotone multiple
preferences model, and the minimax regret model. While there is no imperfect observation of
the DM’s choice, imperfect information arises from these behavioral models themselves. To
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to derive the revealed preference tests for these
models. Our theory facilitates the study because we can transform the problem of checking
rationalizability under these models into a problem of checking the coarse rationalizability of
certain coarse data sets by a linear order.
1This has been briefly discussed in Nishimura et al. (2015) to point to the flexible nature of the revealed
preference framework.
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We then proceed to discuss the coarse rationalizability of a coarse data set by a weak
order. A data point is defined to be a tuple (A,B,D) where A is a feasible set, B and D are
disjoint subsets of A. The interpretation of (A,B,D) is that the observer knows that, when
facing feasible set A, the exact choice of the DM is contained in B, and she also knows the
alternatives in D are not optimal for the DM faced with A. Our analysis here parallels the
analysis for the case of a linear order. A coarse data set O = {(Ai, Bi, Di)}ni=1 is said to be
coarsely rationalizable by a weak order if there exists a weak order R over alternatives such
that the set of maximal elements in Ai according to R has at least one common element with
Bi and is disjoint with Di. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition, termed Coarse
GARP, for coarse rationalizability by a weak order. An efficient algorithm is provided to test
the Coarse GARP condition.
Before we move on to talk about the model and the results, we wish to discuss two
closely related papers. Fishburn (1976) studies when a choice function, which maps each
set of alternatives in a domain of feasible sets into a non-empty subset of itself (called the
choice set), can be representable by a linear order. A choice function is representable by a
linear order if some linear order on the alternatives has its maximal element within each
feasible set, which is contained in the choice set of the feasible set. Fishburn (1976) provides
an axiom that he calls the partial congruence axiom to characterize representable choice
functions, and the core logic is that in every nonempty collection of data points, there exists
at least one alternative that is in the choice set for every feasible set that contains it. This
axiom is essentially what we call Coarse SARP. Our analysis differs from Fishburn (1976) in
several ways. First, we propose an algorithm to test the Coarse SARP condition when there
are finitely many data points, and such a revealed preference analysis is absent in Fishburn
(1976). Second, we show that our theory can be applied to investigate several models of
non-classical decision making. Third, our formulation of rationalization by a weak order and
the corresponding analysis is not covered in Fishburn (1976).
More recently, de Clippel and Rozen (2018) point out a methodological pitfall when
testing choice theories with limited data in the the recent bounded rationality literature.
They then present testable implications for several bounded rationality theories, and propose
an enumeration procedure to test these implications. Both the enumeration procedure in
their paper and the algorithm proposed here share the same core logic in Fishburn (1976).
While de Clippel and Rozen (2018) address the question of incomplete data in the the recent
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bounded rationality literature, we explore related ideas in different settings. Among other
things, we formulate an efficient test for coarse rationalizability by a weak order.
Section 2 presents the basics of the model. Section 3 identifies a necessary and sufficient
condition for a coarse data set to be coarsely rationalizable by a linear order. Section 4 applies
our theory to investigate the observable restrictions of several economic models including (1)
rational choice with imperfect observation; (2) multiple preferences; (3) monotone multiple
preferences; and (4) minimax regret. Section 5 studies coarse rationalizability by a weak
order.
2 Preliminaries
We work with any arbitrarily fixed nonempty set X, which can be viewed as the universal set
of alternatives. Let X be the collection of all nonempty subsets of X. A coarse data set O
is a collection of data points {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 where for each i, Ai ∈ X and Bi is a nonempty
subset of Ai. In the general model, (Ai, Bi) need not have any intrinsic meanings. In each of
the applications that we consider, additional structure will be imposed, and we shall specify
the interpretation of (Ai, Bi). To simplify the statements below, we write Ci rather than
Ai \Bi. We also use the following notations:
A(O′) := ∪(Ai,Bi)∈O′ Ai,
B(O′) := ∪(Ai,Bi)∈O′ Bi,
C(O′) := ∪(Ai,Bi)∈O′ Ci
for any ∅ 6= O′ ⊆ O. Throughout the rest of the paper, unless it leads to confusion, we abuse
the notation by suppressing the set delimiters, e.g., writing x rather than {x}.
A linear order is a reflexive, complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation,
denoted by P . A strict preference is the asymmetric part of a linear order, denoted by .
We use max(A,P ) (resp. max(A,)) to represent the maximal element in A according to P
(resp. ).
We say that a coarse data set O = {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 is coarsely rationalized by some linear
order P if
max(Ai, P ) ∈ Bi
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for all i. If a coarse data set is coarsely rationalized by some linear order P , we say that the
coarse data set is coarsely rationalizable by a linear order.
3 Theory
In this section, we propose a condition that we call Coarse SARP and show that Coarse
SARP is both necessary and sufficient for coarse rationalizability by a linear order. Notably,
the Coarse SARP condition is easy to check.
To fix ideas, let us first consider the familiar case that Bi is a singleton set for all i.
Without loss of generality, we can rewrite O as {(Ai, xi)}ni=1. We say that xi is revealed to
be ranked above y if y ∈ Ai and y 6= xi. It is well known that the data set is rationalizable
by a linear order if and only if the data set obeys the strong axiom of revealed preference
(SARP) condition, which says that there is no revealed cycle on the set of alternatives X.
However, when Bi contains more than one alternative for some i, the revealed preference
analysis becomes less straightforward, as illustrated by Example 1.
We now consider the general case that Bi need not be a singleton set for some i. If Bi
is a not singleton set for some i, then (Ai, Bi) no longer reveals which element is the maximal
element in Ai. Nevertheless, (Ai, Bi) reveals that the maximal element in Ai is not contained
in Ci. For any nonempty subcollection O′ = {(Akj , Bkj )}mj=1 (m ≤ n) of O, since the maximal
element in Akj is not contained in Ckj for all j, the maximal element in A(O′) is necessarily
not contained in C(O′). This simple logic suggests the following necessary condition for
coarse rationalizability by a linear order that we call Coarse SARP:
Coarse SARP. For any ∅ 6= O′ ⊆ O, A(O′) \ C(O′) 6= ∅.
We revisit Example 1 to illustrate how to use the Corase SARP condition to show that
the data set is not coarsely rationalizable by a linear order.
Example 2 (Example 1 Revisited). The data set O is the same as in Example 1. It is easy
to see that A(O) \ C(O) = ∅, which is a violation of the Coarse SARP condition. Thus, we
can conclude that the data set O is not coarsely rationalizable by a linear order.
We have argued above that Coarse SARP is a necessary condition for a data set to be
coarsely rationalizable by a linear order. Theorem 1 below shows that Coarse SARP is also a
sufficient condition for coarse rationalizability by a linear order.
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Theorem 1. A coarse data set O = {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 is coarsely rationalizable by a linear order
if and only if it satisfies the Coarse SARP condition.
The logic of the proof (the if-part) can be summarized as follows. Suppose that a coarse
data set O satisfies the Coarse SARP condition. We shall explicitly construct a linear order
that coarsely rationalizes O. To do this, we first aggregate all the data points in O. Note
that the set of alternatives that might be the globally maximal elements are alternatives
in A(O) \ C(O), which is nonempty by the Coarse SARP condition. We then construct an
incomplete binary relation that ranks x above y if x ∈ A(O) \ C(O) and y ∈ C(O). It is
easy to see that any incomplete binary relation constructed in this way coarsely rationalizes
a data point (Ai, Bi) if Ai contains some element in A(O) \ C(O). Thus, we can remove
such data points from consideration, which leads to a simpler problem (a coarse data set
with fewer data points). We then repeat the above process. In each step, we construct some
incomplete binary relation that coarsely rationalizes some data points, and removing these
data points leads to a simpler problem. Since O is finite, the process ends after finitely many
steps. Finally, we can extend the incomplete binary relations to a linear order that coarsely
rationalizes the data set O. The proof below formalizes this idea.
Proof of Theorem 1. (The if-part) Suppose that the coarse data set O satisfies the Coarse
SARP condition. In what follows, we shall explicitly construct a linear order that coarsely
rationalizes O. Without loss of generality, we assume that A(O) = X.
We start with O1 := O. Let S1 := A(O1) \ C(O1). Since O satisfies the Coarse SARP
property, we know that S1 6= ∅. We proceed by induction. Suppose that we have constructed
Ok and Sk for some k ≥ 1 and Ok 6= ∅, we construct Ok+1 and Sk+1 as follows:
Ok+1 := {(Ai, Bi) ∈ Ok : Ai ∩ Sk = ∅} and
Sk+1 := A(Ok+1) \ C(Ok+1).
We claim that for Ok 6= ∅, Ok+1 is a proper subset of Ok. Since O satisfies the Coarse SARP
property, if Ok 6= ∅, we know that Sk = A(Ok) \C(Ok) 6= ∅. Therefore, A(Ok) ∩ Sk 6= ∅, and
there exists some (Ai, Bi) ∈ Ok such that Ai ∩ Sk 6= ∅ and is eliminated when constructing
Ok+1 from Ok. Now that we have established that for Ok 6= ∅, Ok+1 is a proper subset of
Ok, we can conclude that the construction stops after finitely many steps, when Ot 6= ∅ and
Ot+1 = ∅ for some t. Let us redefine
St+1 := A(O) \ ∪tk=1Sk.
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We now argue that {Sk}t+1k=1 constitutes a partition of the set A(O). To see this, consider
Sj and Sj′ where 1 ≤ j < j′ ≤ t. Note that for any (Ai, Bi) ∈ Oj′ , it must be that Ai∩Sj = ∅.
Otherwise, (Ai, Bi) would have been eliminated in earlier steps. Since this is true for all
(Ai, Bi) ∈ Oj′ , we know that A(Oj′)∩Sj = ∅. Since Sj′ = A(Oj′) \C(Oj′) ⊆ A(Oj′), we have
Sj ∩ Sj′ = ∅.
Next, we define a strict partial order that ranks x above y if x ∈ Sj, y ∈ Sj′ , and
j′ > j. The strict partial order is well defined, since {Sk}t+1k=1 constitutes a partition of
the set A(O). It follows from the Szpilrajn’s extension theorem (Szpilrajn (1930)) that
we can extend the strict partial order to a linear order P . We now show that the linear
order P constructed in this way necessarily satisfies that max(Ai, P ) ∈ Bi for all i. For any
(Ai, Bi) ∈ O, (Ai, Bi) ∈ Ok \ Ok+1 for some k. Since Ai ∩ Sk 6= ∅, and Ai ∩ Sk′ = ∅ whenever
k′ < k,
max(Ai, P ) ∈ Ai ∩ Sk = (Bi ∩ Sk) ∪ (Ci ∩ Sk) = Bi ∩ Sk ⊆ Bi.
This completes the proof.
Remark 1. The Coarse SARP property reduces to the SARP property in the special case
that Bi is a singleton set for all i. Without loss of generality, we rewrite O as {(Ai, xi)}ni=1.
(a) (SARP =⇒ Coarse SARP) Suppose that the Coarse SARP property is violated, then
there exists O′ = {(Akj , xkj)}mj=1 such that A(O′) \ C(O′) = ∅. Therefore, for all xkj , we
have xkj ∈ Ckj′ for some j′. Therefore, (Akj′ , xkj′ ) reveals that xkj′P ∗xkj . Since this is true
for all xkj and since O′ is finite, P ∗ is cyclical and the SARP property is violated. (b)
(Coarse SARP =⇒ SARP) Suppose that the SARP property is violated, then we can find a
sequence {xkj}mj=1 such that xkj+1 ∈ Akj with l = 1, 2, . . . ,m − 1 and xk1 ∈ Akm . Then for
the subcollection of data points O′ = {(Akj , xkj )}mj=1, we have A(O′) \ C(O′) = ∅. Therefore,
the Coarse SARP property is violated.
We now propose a simple algorithm to check whether a coarse data set is coarsely
rationalizable by a linear order (or equivalently, whether the Coarse SARP condition is
satisfied).
Algorithm (linear order).
Step 1. Set k := 1 and O′ := O.
Step 2. Define Ok := O′. If Ok = ∅, stop and output Rationalizable; otherwise,
proceed to Step 3.
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Step 3. Define Sk := A(Ok) \ C(Ok). If Sk = ∅, stop and output Not Rationalizable.
Otherwise, set O′ := {(Ai, Bi) ∈ Ok : Ai ∩ Sk = ∅}. Derive k′ such that
k′ = k + 1. Set k := k′. Go to Step 2.
It follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that the Algorithm (linear order) can be used
to determine whether a coarse data set is coarsely rationalizable by a linear order. Notably,
the algorithm is efficient. Since the algorithm removes at least one data point and at least
one alternative at each step, for an arbitrary coarse data set O = {Ai, Bi}ni=1, the number of
steps required in the algorithm is at most min{|A(O)|, n}.2 In particular, this implies that
the algorithm works well when the number of alternatives is large but the number of data
points is small.
When a coarse data set O = {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 is coarsely rationalizable by a linear order,
the linear order that coarsely rationalizes O is not necessarily unique. Given the multiplicity
of rationalizing linear orders, the readers might wonder, whether we can identify for a given
pair of alternatives x and y, whether one alternative is ranked above the other for every linear
order that coarsely rationalizes O. We say that x is surely ranked above y, denoted by xP sy,
if for every linear order P that coarsely rationalizes O, it holds that xPy. It is easy to see
that P s is transitive, since each linear order that coarsely rationalizes O is transitive.
We assume that the coarse data set O is coarsely rationalizable by a linear order. It is
easy to to identify whether xP sy if ({x, y}, x) ∈ O or ({x, y}, y) ∈ O, as the former reveals
that x is surely ranked above y and the latter reveals that y is surely ranked above x. In
all other cases, we can apply the idea of Varian (1982) and insert one additional data point
({x, y}, y) into the original coarse data set. We then check whether the new coarse data
set O∗ := O ∪ {({x, y}, y)} is coarsely rationalizable by a linear order. If O∗ is coarsely
rationalizable by a linear order, then there exists a linear order that ranks y above x and
coarsely rationalizes the original coarse data set O. This rejects the hypothesis that xP sy. If
O∗ is not coarsely rationalizable by a linear order, then it must be that every linear order
that coarsely rationalizes O ranks x above y. In other words, xP sy.
2For any set S, we denote by |S| its cardinality.
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4 Applications
In this section, we apply our theory in Section 3 to investigate the observable restrictions of
several economic models. The theory immediately carries over to the rational choice model
with imperfect observation. Interestingly, our theory can also be used to develop revealed
preference tests for several behavioral models including the multiple preferences model and
the minimax regret model. To the best of our knowledge, the revealed preference tests for
these models are not yet known. We also introduce a variation of the multiple preference
model that we call monotone multiple preference model, and show that our theory can be
used to develop the revealed preference test for this model as well.
4.1 Rational Choice with Imperfect Observation
In this subsection, we investigate the observable restrictions of the rational choice model,
with a twist that the analyst has imperfect observation of the choice made by the DM. As
in the standard rational choice model, the DM has a strict preference  over X, and she
chooses max(A, ) from each feasible set A ∈ X . Unlike in the standard rational choice
model, the analyst does not observe the exact choice of the DM. Rather, she only observes
that the DM chooses some alternative from a subset of the feasible set. We call this model
rational choice with imperfect observation.
We represent the observed behavior of the DM by (Σ, f), where Σ ⊆ X and f(A) is
superset of the choice of the DM in A ∈ Σ. The interpretation is that, the observer does not
observe the exact choice of the DM, but she knows that the exact choice happens in set f(A)
for each A ∈ Σ. We say that the data set (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the rational choice
model with imperfect observation if there exists a strict preference  such that
max(A, ) ∈ f(A)
for all A ∈ Σ.
For a given data set (Σ, f), we construct a corresponding coarse data set O =
{(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 as follows: (A,B) ∈ O if and only if
A ∈ Σ and f(A) = B.
11
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Then (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the rational choice model with imperfect observation if
and only if O is coarsely rationalizable by a linear order. The results in Section 3 immediately
carry over to this setting, and the arguments are thus not repeated here.
4.2 Multiple Preferences
In this subsection, we investigate the observable restrictions of the multiple preferences model;
see, for example, Salant and Rubinstein (2008). In contrast with the single preference model,
the choice behavior of the DM may be a result of multiple rationales. Formally, the DM has
a set . of strict preferences, and she chooses
f.(A) := {x ∈ A : x = max(A, ) for some ∈ .}
from each feasible set A.
We represent the choice behavior of the DM by (Σ, f), where Σ ⊆ X and f(A) is the
set of all alternatives that the DM chooses in A ∈ Σ. We say that (Σ, f) is rationalizable by
multiple preferences if there exists a set . of strict preferences such that
f.(A) = f(A)
for all A ∈ Σ. In what follows, we shall identify necessary and sufficient conditions under
which (Σ, f) can be rationalizable by multiple preferences.
For a given data set (Σ, f), let us first consider the following coarse data set O =
{A, f(A)}A∈Σ. If (Σ, f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences, then there must exist at least
one preference  such that max(A,) ∈ f(A) for each A ∈ Σ. In other words, the coarse
data set O must be rationalizable by a linear order, and thus the Coarse SARP property is
a necessary condition for rationalizability by multiple preferences. The following example
illustrates that the Coarse SARP property is not a sufficient condition.
Example 3 (A data set that is not rationalizable by multiple preferences). Let X = {x, y, z}.
Consider a data set (Σ, f) consisting of the following three observations:
1. f({x, y}) = x;
2. f({y, z}) = y;
3. f({x, y, z}) = {x, z}.
12
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The coarse data set O = {({x, y}, x), ({(y, z)}, y)}, {({x, y, z}, {x, z})} satisfies the
Coarse SARP property. However, (Σ, f) is not rationalizable by multiple preferences. Suppose
that (Σ, f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences, by definition, there exists a set . of strict
preferences such that f.(A) = f(A) for each A ∈ Σ. Then f({x, y}) = x reveals that x  y
for all ∈ ., and f({y, z}) = y reveals that y  z for all ∈ .. But then, by the transitivity
of strict preference, it must be that x  z for all ∈ ., which contradicts the third observation
that f({x, y, z}) = {x, z}.
For rationalizability by multiple preferences, we need to ensure that, for each A ∈ Σ
and each x ∈ f(A), there is a strict preference such that x is the maximal element in A.
Furthermore, the maximal element according to this strict preference lies in f(A′) for any
other set A′ ∈ Σ. This suggests the following divide-and-conquer approach. For each A ∈ Σ
and x ∈ f(A), we construct a coarse data set OA,x indexed by (A, x) as follows:
OA,x := {(A′, f(A′))}A′∈Σ,A′ 6=A ∪ (A, x).
That is, for each A ∈ Σ and each x ∈ f(A), the coarse data set OA,x is derived from O by
replacing (A, f(A)) with (A, {x}). Let
D := {OA,x}A∈Σ, x∈f(A).
Our logic at the beginning of this paragraph suggests that a necessary condition for the data
set (Σ, f) to be rationalizable by multiple preferences is that each OA,x constructed in this
way is rationalizable by a linear order.
Theorem 2 below shows that (Σ, f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences if and only
if each OA,x in D is rationalized by a linear order.
Theorem 2. (Σ, f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences if and only if each OA,x in D is
rationalizable by a linear order.
Proof of Theorem 2. (The if-part) Suppose that for each A ∈ Σ and x ∈ A, OA,x is
rationalizable by a linear order. Let PA,x denote a linear order that rationalizes OA,x and we
denote by A,x the strict preference induced by PA,x. We then have max(A,A,x) = x ∈ f(A)
and max(A′,A,x) ∈ f(A′) for A′ ∈ Σ and A′ 6= A. We claim that the set of strict preferences
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for each A′ ∈ Σ. But this follows immediately from the construction of the set of strict
preferences, since for each A′ ∈ Σ, (1) each element x in f(A′) is the maximal element in A′
according to the strict preference A′,x; and (2) for any preference  in {A,x}A∈Σ, x∈f(A),
the maximal element according to  lies in f(A′).
Recall from Section 3 that it is easy to test whether a coarse data set is rationalizable
by a linear order. Thus, Theorem 2 provides a tractable way to test whether a given data set
(Σ, f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences.
In what follows, we provide an axiomatization of the multiple preferences model.
Building upon Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we show that the multiple preferences model can
be characterized by the Sen’s α axiom (see Sen (1971)) and an additional axiom that we call
betweenness. The Sen’s α axiom says that if an element is not chosen in a set that contains
it, then this element is not chosen in any superset of this set. The betweenness axiom says
that if B is a superset of A and the chosen alternatives in B coincide with those in A, then
the alternatives chosen in any set that contains A but is contained in B must also be the
same alternatives chosen in A. Formally,
Sen’s α Axiom. For any A,B ∈ X , f(A ∪B) ∩ A ⊆ f(A).
Betweenness Axiom. For any A,B ∈ X with A ⊆ B, if f(A) = f(B), then
f(C) = f(A) for any C such that A ⊆ C ⊆ B.
Theorem 3. (X , f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences if and only if it satisfies the
Sen’s α axiom and the betweenness axiom.
Proof of Theorem 3. (The only-if part) Suppose that (X , f) is rationalizable by multiple
preferences. By definition, there exists a set . of strict preferences such that f.(A) = f(A)
for all A ∈ X . To see that the Sen’s α axiom holds, suppose that x ∈ f(A ∪ B) ∩ A, then
there exists some ∈ . such that x = max(A ∪ B, ). Therefore, x = max(A, ), and
x ∈ f(A). For the betweenness axiom, suppose that A ⊆ C ⊆ B and f(A) = f(B), it suffices
to show that f(A) ⊆ f(C) ⊆ f(B). We first show that f(A) ⊆ f(C). For any x ∈ f(A),
since f(A) = f(B), we have x ∈ f(B) and there exists some ∈ . such that x = max(B, ).
Since x ∈ f(A) ⊆ A ⊆ C ⊆ B, we have x = max(C, ) and thus x ∈ f(C). We now show
that f(C) ⊆ f(B). For any x ∈ f(C), there exists some ∈ . such that x = max(C, ). It
must be that x = max(B, ). Otherwise, max(B, ) ∈ B \ C and max(B, ) /∈ A, which
contradicts that f(A) = f(B).
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(The if-part) Suppose that (X , f) satisfies the Sen’s α axiom and the betweenness axiom,
we show that (X , f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences. For notational simplicity, we
denote by g(A) := A \ f(A) the collection of alternatives that are not chosen for each feasible
set A ∈ X .
Claim 1. For any A ∈ X , f(f(A)) = f(A).
Proof. For any A ∈ X , we have f(A) = f(f(A) ∪ A) ∩ f(A) ⊆ f(f(A)), where the equality
follows from the fact that f(A) ⊆ A, and the set inclusion relation follows from the Sen’s α
axiom. The claim then follows since f(A) ∈ X and f(f(A)) ⊆ f(A).
Claim 2. For any A ∈ X , if x ∈ g(A), then f(f(A) ∪ {x}) = f(A).
Proof. Note that f(A) ⊆ f(A)∪ {x} ⊆ A. It then follows from Claim 1 and the betweenness
axiom that f(f(A) ∪ {x}) = f(A).
Claim 3. For any A,B ∈ X , if f(A) ⊆ B, then f(B) ∩ g(A) = ∅.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary, there exists some x ∈ f(B) ∩ g(A). Since x is not chosen in
A, by Claim 2, x is not chosen in f(A) ∪ {x}. By the Sen’s α axiom, x is not chosen in a
superset of f(A) ∪ {x}. Therefore, x /∈ f(B). We have a contradiction.
Claim 4. For any B ∈ X and ∅ 6= X ′ ⊆ X , if ∪A∈X ′ f(A) \ ∪A∈X ′ g(A) ⊆ B, then f(B) ∩
∪A∈X ′ g(A) = ∅.
Proof. Consider any ∅ 6= X ′ ⊆ X . By the Sen’s α axiom, g(C) ⊆ g(∪A∈X ′ A) for all C ∈ X ′.
Therefore, ∪A∈X ′ g(A) ⊆ g(∪A∈X ′ A). We then have
f(∪A∈X ′ A) = ∪A∈X ′ A \ g(∪A∈X ′ A)
⊆ ∪A∈X ′ A \ ∪A∈X ′ g(A)
= ∪A∈X ′ (f(A) ∪ g(A)) \ ∪A∈X ′ g(A)
= ∪A∈X ′ f(A) \ ∪A∈X ′ g(A).
Thus, if ∪A∈X ′ f(A) \ ∪A∈X ′ g(A) ⊆ B, we must have that f(∪A∈X ′ A) ⊆ B. By Claim 3,
f(B) ∩ g(∪A∈X ′ A) = ∅. The claim follows since ∪A∈X ′g(A) ⊆ g(∪A∈X ′A).
Claim 5. The coarse data set O = {A, f(A)}A∈X satisfies the Coarse SARP property.
15
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303602 
Proof. Suppose to the contrary, there exists ∅ 6= X ′ ⊆ X such that ∪A∈X ′f(A)\∪A∈X ′g(A) = ∅.
Consider an arbitrary nonempty set B ∈ X ′, since ∪A∈X ′f(A) \ ∪A∈X ′g(A) = ∅ ⊆ B, by
Claim 4, we have f(B) ∩ ∪A∈X ′ g(A) = ∅. We have arrived at a contradiction, since
f(B) ⊆ ∪A∈X ′f(A) ⊆ ∪A∈X ′g(A), where the second set inclusion relation follows from the
assumption that ∪A∈X ′f(A) \ ∪A∈X ′g(A) = ∅.
Claim 6. For each A ∈ X and x ∈ A, the coarse data set OA,x satisfies the Coarse SARP
property.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary, for some A ∈ X and x ∈ f(A), the coarse data set OA,x does
not satisfy the Coarse SARP property. Then there exists ∅ 6= X ′ ⊆ X such that
∪B∈X ′ fA,x(B) \ ∪B∈X ′ gA,x(B) = ∅. (1)
We know from Claim 5 that O = {A, f(A)}A∈X satisfies the Coarse SARP property. Since O
and OA,x only differ when the feasible set is A, we can conclude that A ∈ X ′. Let us consider
X ′′ := X ′ \ {A}. Since O = {A, f(A)}A∈Σ satisfies the Coarse SARP property, we have
∪B∈X ′′ fA,x(B) \ ∪B∈X ′′gA,x(B) 6= ∅. (2)
It follows from (1) and (2) that ∪B∈X ′′ fA,x(B) \ ∪B∈X ′′ gA,x(B) ⊆ gA,x(A) ⊆ A, and x ∈
∪B∈X ′′ gA,x(B). Therefore, x ∈ f(A) ∩ ∪B∈X ′′ gx,A(B). But Claim 4 requires that f(A) ∩
∪B∈X ′′ gx,A(B) = ∅. Hence, we arrive at a contradiction.
By Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, (X , f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences. This
completes the proof.
4.3 Monotone Multiple Preferences
In this subsection, we introduce a new model of decision making that we call monotone
multiple preferences. Consider a DM who makes choices in each period t = 1, 2, . . . , n. In
each period t, the DM has a set of rationales (strict preferences) .t. As in the multiple
preferences model an alternative is chosen from a feasible set if and only if it is maximal
according to one of the rationales. Formally, if the DM has a set of strict preferences .t, then
she chooses
f.t(A) := {x ∈ A : x = max(A, ) for some ∈ .t}
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from the feasible set A. The departure from the multiple preferences model analyzed in the
last subsection is that we allow the set of rationales to shrink over time. Formally, we impose
the following monotone structure in the sense of set inclusion on the sequence of sets of strict
preferences:
t > t′ =⇒ .t ⊆ .t′ .
It is easy to see that the monotone multiple preferences model incorporates the multiple
preferences model as a special case.
The monotone multiple preferences model thus has a simple interpretation: The DM
initially has a large set of rationales. As time goes by, she is able to narrow down the list
of rationales that are used to make choices. Let us now offer some justifications for this
model. Consider the common motivation for the multiple preferences model that the DM’s
choices are made in the presence of framing effect; see, for example, Salant and Rubinstein
(2008). Along this line of reasoning, our monotone multiple preferences model requires no
more than that the DM can partly overcome the framing effect over time. Alternatively, one
may think that the DM initially does not fully understand her own preference and is only
certain that her preference lies in some set of preferences. Over time, the DM can rule out
some preferences from the initial set of preferences as her true preference.
In what follows, we shall develop the revealed preference tests for the monotone multiple
preferences model. Suppose that the analyst observes the DM’s choices, and would like to
test whether the DM’s choices are consistent with the monotone multiple preferences model.
Due to the monotone structure of the sets of strict preferences, it shouldn’t come as a surprise
that whether the analyst observes the timing of the DM’s choices plays an important role.
We distinguish the following two cases and propose revealed preference tests in each case. In
the first case, the analyst observes the feasible sets, the choices of the DM, and the timing of
the choices. In the second case, the analyst observes the feasible sets, the choices of the DM,
but not the timing of the choices.
We first consider the case that the analyst observes the feasible sets, the choices of
the DM, and the timing of the choices. The data set can be represented by the tuple
{(At, Bt, t)}nt=1 where t = 1, 2, . . . , n indicates the timing of the DM’s choices, At denotes
the feasible set in period t, and ∅ 6= Bt ⊂ At denotes the DM’s choices from At. We say
that {(At, Bt, t)}nt=1 is rationalizable by monotone multiple preferences if there is a monotone
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sequence of sets of strict preferences {.t}nt=1 such that
Bt = f.t(At)
for all t = 1, 2, . . . , n.
This case is easier to handle. Suppose that the data set {(At, Bt, t)}nt=1 is rationalizable
by monotone multiple preferences. Consider any observation (At, Bt, t) and fix x ∈ Bt. There
necessarily exists a strict preference ∈ .t that ranks x maximal. Due to the monotone
structure of the sets of strict preferences, we also know that ∈ .t′ for any t′ < t. In words,
the rationale ∈ .t that ranks x maximal in At must also be used to make choices in any
earlier period. Subsequently, it must be the case that max(At′ , ) ∈ Bt′ for any t′ < t. Put
succinctly, for each (At, Bt, t) and each x ∈ Bt, there must exist a strict preference  such
that max(At, ) = x and max(At′ , ) ∈ Bt′ for all t′ < t.
For each (At, Bt, t) and each x ∈ Bt, we construct a corresponding coarse data set as
follows:
OAt,x = {(At′ , Bt′) : t′ < t} ∪ {(At, {x})}.
The analysis in the last paragraph suggests that OAt,x is rationalizable by a linear order. Let
D = {OAt,x}At,x∈Bt denote the family of such coarse data sets. Theorem 4 below shows that
{(At, Bt, t)}nt=1 is rationalizable by monotone multiple preferences if and only if each OAt,x in
D is rationalizable by a linear order.
Theorem 4. {(At, Bt, t)}nt=1 is rationalizable by monotone multiple preferences if and only
if each OAt,x in D is rationalizable by a linear order.
Proof. (The if-part) Suppose that each OAt,x in D is rationalizable by a linear order. Let .t
denote the collection of strict preferences such that ∈ .t if and only if  rationalizes OAt,x
for some x ∈ Bt. We show that {(At, Bt, t)}nt=1 is rationalizable under the monotone multiple
preferences model by the sequence of sets of strict preferences {.t}nt=1 constructed in this
way. By construction, Bt = f.t(At) for all t = 1, 2, . . . , n. Thus, it suffices to show that t > t′
implies .t ⊆ .t′ . To see this, note that if t′ < t, ∈ .t implies that  also rationalizes OAt′ ,x
for some x ∈ Bt′ . Thus, ∈ .t′ .
Remark 2. The analysis above should remind our readers of the analysis in the multiple
preferences model. In the multiple preference model, the set of multiple preferences used
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by the DM do not vary as the DM faces different feasible sets. As such, a rationale that
is used to rationalize a particular choice from a feasible set must be used in all the other
choices. Whereas in this model, we allow the DM’s set of rationales to shrink over time. Thus,
the rationale that is used in period t is also used in any earlier period, and subsequently,
the construction of the coarse data set is different from our construction in the multiple
preferences model.
Next, we consider the case in which the analyst only observes the feasible sets, the DM’s
choices, but not the timing of the choices. While this introduces additional complexities
beyond the case in which the analyst also observes the timing of the choices, we show that
the logic of the analysis above carries over to this case.
Since the timing of the choices is not observed, the data set can be represented by
{(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 where Ai denotes the feasible set and ∅ 6= Bi ⊆ Ai denotes the DM’s choices
from At. We should emphasize that i is simply an index of the data point and does not
correspond to the timing of the choices. We say that {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 is rationalized by monotone
multiple preferences if there is a permutation ρ : {1, 2, . . . , n} → {1, 2, . . . , n} and a monotone
sequence of sets of preferences {.t}nt=1 such that
Bi = f.ρ(i)(Ai)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The permutation ρ represents the revealed timing of the choices.
To develop the revealed preferences tests for this case, it is useful to revisit the logic
for the case in which the timing of the choices is observed. If the timing of the choices is
observed, as Theorem 4 shows, it suffices to construct a family of coarse data sets and check
whether each coarse data set is rationalizable by a linear order. The construction of the
coarse data sets, however, requires the knowledge of the timing of the choices. When the
timing of the choices is not observed, one naive way to proceed is to consider all permutations
ρ and for each permutation we can invoke Theorem 4 to check for rationalizability. However,
this is computationally infeasible if n is large. The problem can be circumvented by the
following observation. Rather than going through all permutations ρ to determine the timing
of the choices, we first study the problem of determining which choice occurs in the last
period. Suppose that {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 is rationalizable by monotone multiple preferences. Then
if a choice, say (Al, Bl), occurs in the last period, then for each x in Bj, the corresponding
coarse data set {(Ai, Bi)}i 6=j ∪ {(Aj, x)} is rationalizable by a linear order. Once we have
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determined which choice occurs in the last period, we can apply similar logic to the remaining
data points and determine which choice occurs in the second last period. The logic continues
and we have a tractable way of determining the timing of all the choices. Theorem 5 below
states this formally.
Theorem 5. {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 is rationalizable by monotone multiple preferences if and only if
for any subcollection {(Akj , Bkj)}mj=1, there is (Al, Bl) ∈ {(Akj , Bkj)}mj=1 such that for each
x ∈ Bl, {(Akj , Bkj)}mj=1 \ {(Al, Bl)} ∪ {(Al, x)} is rationalizable by a linear order.
Proof. (The if-part) The assumption ensures that for any collection of data points, there is a
candidate for the choice that occurs last among the data points. Thus, one can simply starts
with all the data points and determine one possible timing of all the choices. The result
follows by applying Theorem 5 to that timing of all the choices.
4.4 Minimax Regret
The minimax regret model is first proposed by Savage (1951) to model a DM who might
anticipate regret and thus incorporate in their choice the desire to minimize the worst-case
regret. In this subsection, we show that, by applying our results in Section 3, one can easily
obtain the observable restrictions of the minimax regret model.
We shall adopt the framework of the state space that has been discussed by, for example,
Kreps (1979) and Dekel et al. (2001). Let u : X → R be a utility function for the DM. Under
utility function u, the regret of choosing x towards y is represented by u(y)− u(x). Given a







The DM chooses an alternative that minimizes the worst-case regret. Formally, the DM has










for all A ∈ X .
We represent the choice behavior of the DM by (Σ, f), where Σ ⊆ X and f(A) is the
alternative that the DM chooses in A ∈ Σ. We assume that f is a choice function. We say
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that (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the minimax regret model if there exists a finite set of
utility functions U such that










for each A ∈ Σ.
Suppose that (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the minimax regret model with a finite set
of utility functions U . We define the relative regret of x towards y as
φ(x, y) := max
u∈U
{u(y)− u(x)} .
Thus, the choice function could be rewritten as








Given the flexibility to construct the set of utility functions to make the choice behavior of
the DM consistent with the minimax regret model, the readers might doubt, whether there
are any observable restrictions of the minimax regret model. The following example presents
a data set (Σ, f) that is not rationalizable under the minimax regret model.
Example 4 (A data set that is not rationalizable under the minimax regret model). Let
X = {x, y, z, w} and A = X. Consider a data set (Σ, f) including the following three
observations: f(A) = x, f(A \ z) = y, and f(A \ w) = y.
Suppose that (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the minimax regret model. Since f(A) = x
and f(A \ z) = y, x generates a lower worst-case regret in set A than y does, but y generates
a lower worst-case regret than x does if we remove the alternative z from the alternative set
A. Therefore, the relative regret of y towards z is the worst-case regret of y in set A, and
is higher than the worst-case regret of x in set A. But then, it cannot be that f(A \ w) = y,
as x generates a lower worst-case regret in set A \ w than the relative regret of y towards z,
which is the worst-case regret of y in set A \ w. We arrive at a contradiction.
The next lemma shows that, without loss of generality, we can work with the following
choice function:








This simplifies the analysis below.
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Lemma 1. There exists a set of utility function U such that (3) holds for each A ∈ Σ if and
only if (4) holds for each A ∈ Σ under the same U .
By Lemma 1, the rationalizability of (Σ, f) under the minimax regret model could be
transformed to the problem of finding a finite set of utility functions U such that
max
r∈A\f(A)
φ(f(A), r) < max
r∈A\z
φ(z, r)
for any z ∈ A \ f(A).
Interestingly, the rationalizability of a data set under the minimax regret model is
related to the rationalizability of a corresponding coarse data set by a linear order. Before we
discuss the construction of the corresponding coarse data set, it is perhaps best to consider
the following thought experiment, which illustrates the logic of the construction. Suppose
that (Σ, f) includes the following observation f({x, y, z}) = x. If (Σ, f) is rationalizable
under the minimax regret model, then it must be the case that the worst-case regret of any
alternative different from x in {x, y, z} is higher than the worst-case regret of x in {x, y, z}.
That is, f({x, y, z}) = x reveals that
max {φ(y, x), φ(y, z)} > max {φ(x, y), φ(x, z)}, and
max {φ(z, x), φ(z, y)} > max {φ(x, y), φ(x, z)}.
For notational simplicity, in what follows, we shall use (x, y) to represent the maximal regret
of x from y.
Following the logic in the last paragraph, for any (Σ, f), we are now ready to construct
the corresponding coarse data set. Let X¯ := {(x, y) ∈ X ×X : x 6= y}. For any (Σ, f), the
corresponding coarse data set O¯ can be constructed as follows: (A¯i, B¯i) ∈ O¯ if and only if
there exists y ∈ A ∈ Σ with y 6= f(A) such that
A¯i = {y × (A \ y)} ∪ {f(A)× (A \ f(A))}, and
B¯i = y × (A \ y).
The interpretation of the data point (A¯i, B¯i) is then that alternative y which is not chosen in
A generates a higher worst-case regret in A than f(A) does. The following theorem shows
that (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the minimax regret model if and only if the corresponding
coarse data set O¯ is rationalizable by a linear order.
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Theorem 6. (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the minimax regret model if and only if the
corresponding coarse data set O¯ is rationalizable by a linear order.
Proof of Theorem 6. (The only if-part) Suppose that (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the
minimax regret model, by definition, there exists a finite set of utility functions U such
that







holds for each A ∈ Σ. We claim that φ could represent a complete and transitive binary
relation defined on X¯. Formally, denote this binary relation as RR which we call the regret
relation. We have that φ(x, y)RRφ(z, w) if and only if φ(x, y) ≥ φ(z, w). For each A ∈ Σ,
f(A) = arg min(
(




Thus, the relation RR satisfies that for any (A¯, B¯) ∈ O, there is some set A ∈ Σ such
that A¯ = {z}×A\{z}∪{f(A)}×A\{f(A)} with z 6= f(A) and B¯ = {z}×A\{z}. As a result,
it must be that there is some y 6= z such that (z, y)R∗(f(A), yˆ) and not (f(A), yˆ)R∗(z, y) for
any yˆ ∈ A\{f(A)}. Easy to see that if we simply assigns some tie-breaking rule to R∗ and
transfer it to R∗∗ which is a linear order over X¯, it still holds that there is some y 6= z such
that (z, y)R∗∗(f(A), yˆ) and not (f(A), yˆ)R∗∗(z, y) for any yˆ ∈ A\{f(A)}. As a result, the
maximal element in each A¯ must be contained in the set B¯ according to the linear order R∗∗.
We finish the sufficient part of the proof.
(The if-part) Suppose that O¯ is rationalizable by a linear order, by definition, there
exists a linear order P defined on X¯ such that for each (A¯, B¯) ∈ O¯, max(A¯, P ) ∈ B¯. Take
the asymmetric part of P as .. It suffices to show that there exists a finite set of utility
function U such that for any (x, y), (z, w) ∈ X¯, (x, y) . (z, w) if and only if φ(x, y) > φ(z, w),
where φ is constructed from U .
As X¯ is finite, we can find a function β : X¯ → (1, 2) such that (x, y) . (z, w) if and
only if β(x, y) > β(z, w). Now consider a finite set of utility functions U := {ux,y}(x,y)∈X¯ ,




0, if z = x,
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Thus, ux,y(y)− ux,y(x) = β(x, y) ∈ (1, 2). Furthermore, we claim that uz,w(y)− uz,w(x) < 1
if (z, w) 6= (x, y). To see this, first consider the case in which w 6= y. By construction of the
utility functions and the β function,
uz,w(y)− uz,w(x) ≤ uz,w(y) ≤ β(z, w)2 ∈ (0, 1).
Now consider the case in which w = y. Since (z, w) 6= (x, y), we have z 6= x. By construction
of the utility functions, uz,w(x) = β(z,w)2 and uz,w(y) = β(z, w). Therefore, uz,w(y)−uz,w(x) =
β(z,w)
2 ∈ (0, 1). This implies that
φ(x, y) = max
u∈U
[u(y)− u(x)] = ux,y(y)− ux,y(x) = β(x, y).
Therefore, we have explicitly constructed a finite set of utility functions U such that for any
(x, y), (z, w) ∈ X¯, (x, y) . (z, w) if and only if φ(x, y) > φ(z, w), where φ is constructed from
U . This completes the proof.
We revisit Example 4 to illustrate how to use Theorem 6 to show that the data set is
not rationalizable.
Example 5 (Example 4 Revisited). The data set is the same as in Example 4. We construct
the corresponding coarse data set O¯ as follows:
1. A¯1 = {(y, x), (y, z), (y, w), (x, y), (x, z), (x,w)}, B¯1 = {(y, x), (y, z), (y, w)};
2. A¯2 = {(z, x), (z, y), (z, w), (x, y), (x, z), (x,w)}, B¯2 = {(z, x), (z, y), (z, w)};
3. A¯3 = {(w, x), (w, y), (w, z), (x, y), (x, z), (x,w)}, B¯3 = {(w, x), (w, y), (w, z)};
4. A¯4 = {(x, y), (x,w), (y, x), (y, w)}, B¯4 = {(x, y), (x,w)};
5. A¯5 = {(w, x), (w, y), (y, x), (y, w)}, B¯5 = {(w, x), (w, y)};
6. A¯6 = {(x, y), (x, z), (y, x), (y, z)}, B¯6 = {(x, y), (x, z)};
7. A¯7 = {(z, x), (z, y), (y, x), (y, z)}, B¯7 = {(z, x), (z, y)}.
By Theorem 1, the coarse data set O¯ is not rationalizable by a linear order. In particular,
for O¯′ = {(A¯1, B¯1), (A¯4, B¯4), (A¯6, B¯6)}, B(O¯′) \ C(O¯′) = ∅. By Theorem 6, (Σ, f) is not
rationalizable under the minimax regret model.
24
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303602 
5 Weak order
Our analysis above centers around the coarse rationalizability of a coarse data set by a linear
order. We shall now extend our analysis to the case of coarse rationalizability by a weak
order. A weak order is a complete and transitive binary relation, denoted by R. We abuse
the notation slightly and denote the asymmetric part of R by P . We write max(A,R) to
denote the maximal alternatives in A according to R. If xRy, we say that x is ranked weakly
above y. If xRy and not yRx, we say that x is ranked strictly above y.
One way to define the coarse rationalizability of a coarse data set by a weak order is as
follows: A coarse data set O = {(Ai, Bi)}ni=1 is rationalized by a weak order R if
max(Ai, R) ∩Bi 6= ∅
for all i. Note that every coarse data set can be rationalizable by a weak order as the
DM could be indifferent among all alternatives in X. In many settings, however, we may
have some prior knowledge of the DM’s preferences. Then, we could incorporate such prior
knowledge of the DM’s preference into the revealed preference exercise.3
Throughout the rest of this section, we shall model a data point to be a tuple (A,B,D)
where A is a feasible set, B and D are disjoint subsets of A, and B∪D 6= ∅. The interpretation
of (A,B,D) is that when the DM is faced with the feasible set A, the analyst knows that
the exact choice of the DM is contained in B. Furthermore, she also knows the alternatives
in D are not maximal for the DM in A. A coarse data set O is a collection of data points
{(Ai, Bi, Di)}ni=1, where Bi and Di are disjoint subsets of Ai, and Bi ∪Di 6= ∅ for all i. We
say that a coarse data set O = {(Ai, Bi, Di)}ni=1 is coarsely rationalizable by a weak order if
there exists a weak order R defined on X such that
max(Ai, R) ∩Bi 6= ∅ and max(Ai, R) ∩Di = ∅
for all i.
To fix ideas, let us first consider the familiar case that Bi is a singleton set for all i.
Without loss of generality, we can rewrite O as {(Ai, xi, Di)}ni=1. We say that xi is revealed
3For example, suppose that the analyst has prior knowledge that the DM ranks x strictly above y and
also suppose that the DM chooses z from {x, y, z}. Then the choice reveals that the DM ranks z weakly over
x and ranks z strictly above y.
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to be ranked weakly above y if y ∈ Ai and y 6= xi and that xi is revealed to be ranked strictly
above z if z ∈ Di. It is well known that the data set is rationalizable by a weak order if and
only if the data set obeys the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) condition,
which says that there is no strict revealed cycle on the set of alternatives X. However, when
Bi contains more than one alternative for some i, the revealed preference analysis becomes
less straightforward.
As in the case of linear order, we proceed to identify necessary and sufficient conditions
for a coarse data set to be coarsely rationalized by a weak order. For ease of notation, we
write
D(O′) = ∪(Ai,Bi,Di)∈O′ Di.
A natural conjecture is that we can work with B(O′) \D(O′) and check whether it is empty
for each subcollection ∅ 6= O′ ⊆ O. Indeed, if a coarse data set O = {(Ai, Bi, Di)}ni=1 is
coarsely rationalizable by a weak order, by definition, for all (Ai, Bi, Di), Bi contains an
alternative that is strictly ranked above all alternatives in Di. Thus, for each subcollection
∅ 6= O′ ⊆ O, B(O′) contains an alternative that is strictly ranked above all alternatives in
D(O′), and B(O′) \D(O′) 6= ∅. While this is necessary, this is not sufficient for the coarse
rationalizability of a coarse data set by a weak order.
The reason that working with B(O′) \D(O′) for each subcollection ∅ 6= O′ ⊆ O is not
sufficient is as follows. This logic overlooks the information that for all (Ai, Bi, Di), some
alternative in Bi is ranked weakly above all alternatives in Ai. In what follows, we propose a
procedure that incorporates such information, and identify a necessary and sufficient condition
for coarse rationalizability of a coarse data set by a weak order.
Suppose that a coarse data set O = {(Ai, Bi, Di)}ni=1 is coarsely rationalizable by a
weak order. By definition, for all i, Bi contains an alternative that is strictly ranked above
all alternatives in Di and weakly ranked above all alternatives in Ai. Consequently, for any
∅ 6= O′ ⊆ O, B(O′) is directly revealed to contain an alternative that is strictly ranked
above all alternatives in D(O′). This logic is exactly the same as that in the case of coarse
rationalizability by a linear order. However, this is not sufficient for rationalizability of a
coarse data set by a weak order, because it does not capture that for all i, Bi contains an
alternative that weakly ranked above all alternatives in Ai.
Suppose that Bi ⊆ D(O′) for some (Ai, Bi, Di) ∈ O′. Since Bi contains an alternative
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that is weakly ranked above all alternatives in Ai, D(O′) contains an alternative that is
weakly ranked above all alternatives in Ai. By the transitivity of the weak order, B(O′)
contains an alternative that is strictly ranked above all alternatives in Ai. In other words,
alternatives in Ai cannot be the maximal elements in A(O′). Thus, the logic expands the set
of alternatives that cannot be maximal in A(O′).
Motivated by the logic in the previous paragraph, we define the following operator E1
such that
E1(O′, E) := (∪(Ai,Bi,Di)∈O′:Bi⊆E Ai) ∪ E (5)
for all ∅ 6= O′ ⊆ O and E ∈ X . It follows that E contains an alternative that is weakly
ranked above all alternatives in E1(O′, E). Recursively, we can define
En(O′, E) := E1(O′, En−1(O′, E)).
By the same reasoning, for all n, En−1(O′, E) contains an alternative that is weakly ranked
above all alternatives in En(O′, E). By the transitivity of the weak order, E contains at least
one alternative that is weakly ranked above every alternative in En(O′, E) for all n.
By the construction of the operator E1, E1(O′, E) is increasing in E in the sense that if
E ⊆ E ′ then E1(O′, E) ⊆ E1(O′, E ′). Since E ⊆ E1(O′, E), we have
En(O′, E) ⊆ En+1(O′, E)
for all n. Let N be the smallest integer such that EN+1(O′, E) = EN(O′, E). Since X is
finite, En(O′, E) necessarily converges to EN(O′, E) in finitely many steps. Let E(O′, E) =
EN(O′, E).
Since D(O′) contains at least one alternative that is weakly ranked above every
alternative in E(O′, D(O′)) and B(O′) contains an alternative that is strictly ranked above
all alternatives in D(O′), by transitivity of weak order, B(O′) necessarily contains an
alternative that is strictly ranked above all alternatives in E(O′, D(O′)). As such, we have
B(O′)\E(O′, D(O′)) 6= ∅. For notational simplicity, we write E(O′) rather than E(O′, D(O′)).
Our analysis so far suggests the following necessary condition for coarse rationalizability by a
weak order that we call Coarse GARP:
Coarse GARP. For any ∅ 6= O′ ⊆ O, B(O′) \ E(O′) 6= ∅.
Theorem 7 below shows that Coarse GARP is also sufficient for coarse rationalizability
of a coarse data set by a weak order.
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Theorem 7. A coarse data set O = {(Ai, Bi, Di)}ni=1 is coarsely rationalizable by a weak
order if and only if it satisfies the Coarse GARP property.
The necessity has been discussed in the previous paragraph. For sufficiency, we explicitly
construct a weak order that coarsely rationalizes O. To do this, we first decompose O by
iteratively excluding the data points that involve the (revealed) highest-ranked alternatives.
Simultaneously, X is partitioned by iteratively excluding the (revealed) highest-ranked
alternatives. Next, we define a weak order on X according to the decomposition of X. Finally,
we verify that such a weak order indeed rationalizes the data set O.
Proof of Theorem 7. (The if-part) Suppose that O satisfies the Coarse GARP property. We
show that O is coarsely rationalizable by a weak order by explicitly constructing a weak order
that coarsely rationalizes O.
Let O1 := O and S1 := B(O1) \ E(O1). Since O satisfies the Coarse GARP property,
we know that S1 6= ∅. We proceed by induction. Suppose that we have constructed Ok and
Sk for some k ≥ 1 and Ok 6= ∅, we construct Ok+1 and Sk+1 as follows:
Ok+1 := {(Ai, Bi, Di) ∈ Ok : Bi ∩ Pk = ∅};
Sk+1 := B(Ok+1) \ E(Ok+1).
We claim that for each Ok 6= ∅, Ok+1 is a proper subset of Ok. Since O satisfies the Coarse
GARP property, if Ok 6= ∅, we know that Sk = B(Ok) \ E(Ok) 6= ∅. Thus, B(Ok) ∩ Sk 6= ∅,
and there exists some (Ai, Bi, Di) ∈ Ok such that Bi ∩ Sk 6= ∅ and is eliminated when
constructing Ok+1 from Ok. Now that we have established that for Ok 6= ∅, Ok+1 is a proper
subset of Ok, we can conclude that the construction stops after finitely many steps, when
Ot 6= ∅ and Ot+1 = ∅ for some t. Let us redefine
St+1 := X \ (∪tk=1Sk).
We now argue that {Sk}t+1k=1 constitutes a partition of X.
Claim 7. E(Ok+1) ⊆ E(Ok) for k = 1, 2, ..., t− 1.
Proof. By the construction of the operator E1, E1(O′, E) is increasing in both O′ and E.
Therefore,
Ok+1 ⊆ Ok =⇒ E1(Ok+1, D(Ok+1)) ⊂ E1(Ok, D(Ok)).
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By induction, we know that En(Ok+1, D(Ok+1)) ⊆ En(Ok, D(Ok)) for all n. Thus, E(Ok+1) ⊆
E(Ok).
Claim 8. {Sk}t+1k=1 constitutes a partition of X.
Proof. By construction, St+1 = X \ (∪tk=1Sk). Thus, to show that {Sk}t+1k=1 constitutes a
partition of X, it suffices to show that Sj ∩ Sj′ = ∅ for 1 ≤ j < j′ ≤ t. This follows from
Sj = B(Oj) \ E(Oj), and
Sj′ = B(Oj′) \ E(Oj′) ⊆ B(Oj′) ⊆ E(Oj′−1) ⊆ E(Oj),
where the first set inclusion is trivial and the third set inclusion follows from Claim 7. To see
that the second set inclusion holds, let us consider an arbitrary (Ai, Bi, Di) ∈ Oj′ . By the
construction of Oj′ and Sj′−1, it must be that
Bi ∩ Sj′−1 = Bi ∩ (B(Oj′−1) \ E(Oj′−1)) = ∅. (6)
Otherwise, (Ai, Bi, Di) would have been eliminated in earlier steps. Since (Ai, Bi, Di) ∈ Oj′ ⊆
Oj′−1, we know that Bi ⊆ B(Oj′−1). It then follows from (6) that Bi ⊆ E(Oj′−1). Since this
holds for all (Ai, Bi, Di) ∈ Oj′ , we can conclude that B(Oj′) ⊆ E(Oj′−1).
We now construct a weak order R defined on X such that (1) xRy and yRx if and only
if x, y ∈ Sk for some k; and (2) xPy if and only if x ∈ Sj and y ∈ Sj′ with j < j′. Since
{Sk}t+1k=1 constitutes a partition of X, the weak order R is well defined.
We are left with the task to show that R coarsely rationalizes the coarse data set O. In
what follows, we verify that
max(Ai, R) ∩Bi 6= ∅ and max(Ai, R) ∩Di = ∅
for all i. Fix i, and suppose that (Ai, Bi, Di) ∈ Ok \ Ok+1 for some 1 ≤ k ≤ t, we know
that Bi ∩ Sk 6= ∅. Moreover, Bi ∩ Sk′ = ∅ for all k′ < k. Otherwise, (Ai, Bi, Di) would
have been eliminated in earlier steps. We show that Bi ⊆ E(Ok′) and Ai ⊆ E(Ok′) for all
k′ < k. Since Bi ⊆ B(Ok) ⊆ B(Ok′), the definition of Sk′ , i.e., Pk′ = B(Ok′) \ E(Ok′), and
Bi ∩ Pk′ = ∅ imply that Bi ⊆ E(Ok′). It follows from Bi ⊆ E(Ok′) that Ai ⊆ E(Ok′), because
Ai ⊆ E1(Ok′ , E(Ok′)) = E(Ok′), where the set inclusion follows from the definition of E1(·) and
the equality from the definition of E(·). Therefore, we have Ai∩Sk′ = Ai∩B(Ok′)\E(Ok′) = ∅
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for all k′ < k, i.e., Ai contains no alternative that is higher ranked than those in Sk. Note
that Bi ∩ Sk 6= ∅ implies Ai ∩ Pk 6= ∅. Hence,
max(Ai, R) ∩Bi = Ai ∩ Pk ∩Bi 6= ∅.
Furthermore, since Sk ∩ E(Ok) = ∅ and Di ⊆ E(Ok), we have
max(A,R) ∩Di = Ai ∩ Sk ∩Di = ∅.
Remark 3. The Coarse GARP property reduces to the GARP property in the special case
that Bi is a singleton set for all i. Without loss of generality, we rewrite O as {(Ai, xi, Di)}ni=1.
(a) (GARP =⇒ Coarse GARP) Suppose that the Coarse GARP property is violated,
then there exists O′ = {(Akj , xkj , Dkj)}mj=1 such that B(O′) \ E(O′) = ∅. Therefore, for
xkj , xkj is ranked strictly below another xkj′ . Since this is true for all xkj and since O′
is finite, we have a violation of the GARP property. (b) (Coarse GARP =⇒ GARP)
Suppose that the GARP property is violated, then we can find a sequence {xkj}mj=1 such that
xkj+1 ∈ Akj with l = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1 and xk1 ∈ Dkm . Then for the subcollection of data points
O′ = {(Akj , xkj , Dkj )}mj=1, we have B(O′) \ E(O′) = ∅. Therefore, the Coarse SARP property
is violated.
Next, we propose a simple algorithm to check whether a coarse data set is coarsely
rationalizable by a weak order (or equivalently, whether the Coarse SARP condition is
satisfied). The algorithm is a variant of the one we proposed in Section 3, where k and O′
are variables.
Stratification Algorithm*.
Step 1. Set k := 1 and O′ := O.
Step 2. Define Ok := O′. If Ok = ∅, stop and output Rationalizable; otherwise,
proceed to Step 3.
Step 3. Define Sk := B(Ok) \ E(Ok). If Sk = ∅, stop and output Not Rationalizable;
otherwise, set O′ := {(A,B,D) ∈ Ok : B ∩ Sk = ∅}. Derive k′ such that
k′ = k + 1. Set k := k′. Go to Step 2.
We now seek to identify for a given pair of alternatives x and y, whether one alternative
is ranked above the other for every weak order that rationalizes O. We say that x is surely
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weakly ranked above y, denoted by xRsy, if for each weak order R that coarsely rationalizes
O, it holds that xRy. It is straightforward to see that Rs is transitive, since each weak order
that coarsely rationalizes O is transitive. The definition for P s is similar. We seek to identify
the relation of xRsy and xP sy. In what follows, we assume that the coarse data set O is
coarsely rationalizable by a weak order.
To test xRsy, we add the data point ({x, y}, y, x) into the original coarse data set O,
and work with the new coarse data set O∗ := O∪({x, y}, y, x). If O∗ is coarsely rationalizable
by a weak order, then there exists a weak order that strictly ranks y above x and coarsely
rationalizes the original coarse data set O. As a result, the hypothesis that xRsy is rejected.
If O∗ is not coarsely rationalizable by a weak order, then every weak order R that coarsely
rationalizes O necessarily satisfies that xRy. In other words, xRsy. Similarly, to test whether
xP sy, we add the observation ({x, y}, y, ∅) into the original coarse data set O, and work with
the new coarse data set O ∪ {({x, y}, y, ∅)}.
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